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INTRODUCTION 
 
Long-distance marriages were once characterized by letter-writing, 
with weeks or months passing before another communication from one’s 
partner would arrive. With the advent of virtual communication technologies, 
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including telephone calls, instant messaging, and e-mails, this 
communication has become instantaneous. Furthermore, Skype and virtual 
reality allow for face-to-face, real-time contact. As this technology advances, 
more and more people will inevitably conduct their marriages virtually.  
Despite the use of virtual communication technology to help 
individuals create and maintain authentic relationships online, courts, 
regulators, and legislators have not recognized this technology in the 
immigration and marriage context. Instead, they have required couples to 
actually reside together and used physical separation as proof of fraudulent 
marriages. This is especially problematic for immigrants, as one of the 
primary ways immigrants obtain lawful presence and citizenship in the 
United States is through marriage. However, these marriages must be 
authentic in the eyes of the state, and U.S. courts have consistently refused to 
recognize the authenticity of marriages in which the couple communicates 
over the Internet.  
This lack of recognition of virtually conducted marriages can be 
traced to the U.S. government’s historic treatment of immigration as a system 
of exclusion, family separation, and policing of fraud as well as the institution 
of marriage. Because marriage is a path to citizenship and both immigration 
and marriage are such heavily policed institutions, the U.S. government is 
disincentivized to expand its definition of what constitutes a “real” marriage. 
Regardless, this lack of recognition penalizes couples who conduct their 
relationship in an increasingly common format—physically apart and online. 
Despite the flexibility of some courts to allow periods of physical separation, 
the U.S. immigration system still overwhelmingly privileges relationships in 
which couples live together over relationships that make extensive use of 
virtual communication technology to bridge physical separation. 
The immigration system’s treatment of this technology starkly 
contrasts with how the child custody system has embraced it to allow for 
parents to create virtual visitation plans. While the immigration system has 
largely been silent or antagonistic towards virtual communication 
technology, courts have encouraged its use in child custody to maintain 
meaningful connections between parents and children who live apart. Not 
only do courts make use of this technology in the child custody system, they 
recognize its ability to foster emotional closeness.  
In Section I of this Comment, I discuss virtual communication 
technology’s capacity to bridge physical distance. In Section II, I explore 
scholarship on the ability of this technology to maintain and facilitate new 
forms of intimacy. In Section III, I review how courts, federal agencies, and 
Congress have treated physical separation for immigrant couples applying for 
permanent residency and citizenship through marriage. I assert that although 
some courts interpret the law in this area more expansively, generally the 
authenticity of a marriage between an immigrant and U.S. citizen is 
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questioned more searchingly if there are periods of physical separation in their 
relationship. In Section IV, I examine some of the policy motivations behind 
the immigration system and how they can provide context for this area of the 
law. In Section V, I compare the immigration system’s treatment of virtual 
communication technology to the child custody system’s treatment of the same 
technology. I argue that differences between the two systems provide insight 
into why immigration has been less receptive to this technology. In Section VI, 
I provide recommendations for how the immigration system can better 
recognize the validity of relationships that are conducted online.  
 
I. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY’S USAGE AND CAPABILITIES 
 
Virtual communication technology can be defined as “any technology 
people use to communicate with each other when they can’t be face to face.”1 
This broad definition includes technologies like email, text message, video 
chat services (like Skype and FaceTime), and phone calls. For the purposes of 
this Comment, non-instantaneous communications like letters are excluded 
from this definition. Although letters do allow people to communicate while 
physically apart, their production does not involve the use of technology, and 
their non-instantaneous nature changes how they impact relationships. For 
example, text messages allow for constant back-and-forth communication 
between partners who are physically separated, which facilitates a different 
connection than letters that can take weeks to arrive.  
This technology has revolutionized the way people interact with one 
another and has become widespread globally. It has opened doors for instant 
communication between people who are located thousands of miles apart. For 
example, Skype was one of the pioneering technologies that allowed users to 
make cheap voice calls, video calls, and chat, all over an online platform.2 In less 
than ten years since its inception in 2003, global users reached 300 million.3 
Since Skype was popularized, more and more technologies have entered the 
market that facilitate virtual communication, including WhatsApp, Viber, 
Google+ Hangouts, and ooVoo, among others.4 Furthermore, as of 2019, it is 
 
1 Cheryl A. Frost, What is Virtual Communication Technology?, TECHWALLA, 
https://www.techwalla.com/articles/what-is-virtual-communication-technology [https://perma. 
cc/B2S2-HR7Z] (last visited Nov. 9, 2019). 
2 Ken Yeung, Skype is 10 Years Old, and in the Past Decade It’s Helped Transform the Way 
That We Communicate, TNW (Aug. 29, 2013), https://thenextweb.com/Microsoft/2013/08/ 
29/skype-is-10-years-old-and-in-the-past-decade-its-helped-transform-the-way-that-we-com 
municate [https://perma.cc/K3BE-KGM3].  
3 Id.  
4 See id. (discussing how WhatsApp and similar companies have emerged as competitors to Skype). 
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estimated that over five billion people globally have mobile devices.5 As of 
2018, the median rate of social media usage is over 50 percent.6 It should be 
noted that mobile technology is more common in the developed world, and 
among young people and well-educated people.7 Still, all of these statistics 
show that virtual communication technology has become commonplace, and 
therefore much of human communication now lives virtually.  
Virtual communication technology will only advance in the future, 
especially with the advent of virtual reality. Virtual reality can be defined as 
“a technology by which computer-aided stimuli create the immersive illusion 
of being somewhere else . . . .”8 Using an apparatus like a headset, virtual 
reality promises to remove the screen barrier of current virtual 
communication technology and allow participants to enter into a virtual 
world.9 In this virtual world, people can interact with digital versions of other 
people.10 They can see other people’s gestures and expressions, mimicking 
the sense of being in the same physical space.11 These technological advances 
only make it more likely that people will communicate virtually and be able 
to conduct full relationships while physically separated. 
 
II. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON  
COUPLE RELATIONALITY 
 
In order to adequately assess immigration law’s preferencing of 
couples who reside in the same physical space, the assumption behind that 
prioritization must first be addressed – the assumption that the intimacy and 
authenticity of a couple’s relationship are exclusively negatively impacted 
when that relationship exists primarily online. This assumption speaks to 
broader questions about how technology, specifically virtual interaction 
technology, has affected the way couples relate to one another.  
 
5 Laura Silver, Smartphone Ownership Is Growing Rapidly Around the World, but Not Always 
Equally, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://pewresearch.org/global/2019/02/05/smart 
phone-ownership-is-growing-rapidly-around-the-world-but-not-always-equally [https://perma 
.cc/V2WB-8RFD].  
6 Jacob Poushter, Caldwell Bishop & Hanyu Chwe, Social Media Use Continues to Rise in 
Developing Countries but Plateaus Across Developed Ones, PEW RES. CTR. (June 19, 2018), 
https://pewresearch.org/global/2018/06/19/social-media-use-continues-to-rise-in-developing- 
countries-but-plateaus-across-developed-ones [https://perma.cc/U2J9-GUQZ].  
7 Silver, supra note 5. 
8 Peter Rubin & Jess Grey, The WIRED Guide to Virtual Reality, WIRED (Mar. 8, 2020, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-virtual-reality/ [https://perma.cc/YR2C-QBCB]. 
9 See id. (discussing the development and future prospects of virtual reality). 
10 Elizabeth Shockman, How Advances in Virtual Communication Technology Will Change 
How We Work and Communicate, PUB. RADIO INT’L (Mar. 14, 2016, 8:45 AM), 
https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-03-14/how-advances-virtual-reality-will-change-how-we-
work-and-communicate [https://perma.cc/6DCQ-9DWG]. 
11 Id. 
Vol. 6:1]         What is Love?  
 
 
181 
Few scholars have written on this topic (79 of over 11,000 articles 
published in couple and family therapy journals between 1996 and 2010 were 
about technology),12 but those who have agree that virtual interaction 
technologies can help strengthen romantic partnerships. Most obviously, this 
technology allows couples separated by physical distance to communicate 
with one another. Internet technology can approximate real-life interactions, 
with users delivering similar verbal cues as they would in person.13 Beyond 
approximation, some scholars have found that technological advances can 
enhance intimacy in relationships.14 Online technologies allow for more 
frequent communication on different platforms, from texting to calling to 
Skype.15 More frequent communication facilitates greater self-disclosure about 
one’s daily life and emotions, which in turn builds stronger commitment to one 
another and satisfaction in the relationship.16 Furthermore, computer users are 
less inhibited in their online interactions, which encourages greater 
intimacy.17 While some may argue that intimacy requires shared space and 
cohabitation, these scholars have found evidence that suggests physical 
distance and emotional closeness are not mutually exclusive. 
 The results of these studies, indicating that online relationships have the 
potential to be even more intimate than in-person relationships, undermine the 
immigration system’s assumption that these relationships are any less able to be 
“real.” Virtual communication technology has changed the way relationships are 
conducted, allowing for intimacy to develop and be maintained beyond the 
confines of occupying the same physical space. In other words, virtual 
relationships can be just as authentic as relationships in which couples live 
together. Additionally, because of the inherently transnational nature of 
immigrants’ relationships with U.S. citizens, many of these relationships might 
have to rely on technology to maintain any sort of relationship at all. 
A study on Filipino seamen’s wives demonstrates these findings in 
practice. Prepaid phone cards have made mobile communication widely 
accessible in the Philippines, allowing wives to communicate frequently with 
their husbands abroad via cell phones.18 Compared to the previous method of 
 
12 Katherine M. Hertlein, Digital Dwelling: Technology in Couple and Family Relationships, 
61 FAM. REL. 374, 374 (2012). 
13 Id. at 377.  
14 See id. at 380 ("Participation in online activities can enhance intimacy and feelings of 
closeness between partners . . . .”). 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 See id. (asserting that enhanced intimacy from participating in online activities is due in part to 
online communications being less inhibited than face-to-face communications). 
18 See Roderick G. Galam, Communication and Filipino Seamen’s Wives Imagined 
Communion and the Intimacy of Absence, 60 PHIL. STUD.: HIST. & ETHNOGRAPHIC 
VIEWPOINTS 223, 235–36 (2012) (contending that prepaid phone cards have made mobile 
phone calls more affordable, and therefore have improved communication between spouses). 
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sending letters, phones are easier, faster, and help couples adjust better to 
separation.19 The constant cell phone communication enables seamen to 
maintain a presence in the family, even when they are not physically 
available.20 Furthermore, text messaging preserves intimacy in these 
relationships because it allows spouses to express their affection for each 
other through words.21 The spread of mobile communication technology 
means that seamen not only can remain involved in the daily lives of their 
families, but also can strengthen and build their relationships.22 Although 
phones might facilitate real-time conflict between spouses, it has also allowed 
couples to create a space of “imagined communion” where their relationship 
and intimacy continue to grow.23 
For members of the Caribbean diaspora, in which family members are 
spread throughout the world, technology is a powerful tool to stay connected 
to one another and maintain intimate relationships. Among these 
communities, social media is used to provide caregiving transnationally.24 For 
example, when there is a familial crisis, social media provides a web of 
extended kinship networks that can easily be tapped to come up with a 
solution.25 Platforms like Facebook also open up new avenues for familial 
connection. For example, giving family members abroad access to personal 
photo albums allows them to experience events vicariously for which they 
might not have been physically present, even if everyone lived in the same 
physical space.26 Although these findings did not specifically apply to spousal 
relationships, they still provide evidence that relationships maintained cross-
nationally can flourish online and even find new forms of expression.  
Of course, distance and intimacy mediated through a screen can 
negatively impact a relationship. Traveling to see one another is resource-
intensive, and physical distance can impact the intimacy and familiarity 
couples have with one another.27 However, as both the examples of Filipino 
 
19 Id. at 236. 
20 Id. at 238. 
21 Id. at 250. 
22 Id. at 254–55. 
23 Id. at 224, 247, 254–55. 
24 See Dwaine Plaza & Amy Below, Social Media as a Tool for Transnational Caregiving Within 
the Caribbean Diaspora, 63 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 25, 38 (2014) (noting that many families in the 
study used a “transnational multi-generational care model” of electronic communication). 
25 Id. at 38–39. 
26 See id. at 41 (highlighting an example in which an uncle living in Trinidad could see photos 
of his nephew in Canada at social events that the uncle could not have appropriately 
attended—even if living in Canada—on account of underage drinking and drug use). 
27 See generally Stephen J. Betchen, Four Problems with Long Distance Relationships, 
PSYCHOL. TODAY (June 14, 2015), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/magnetic-
partners/201506/4-problems-long-distance-relationships [https://perma.cc/X5GX-YYG6] 
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seamen and the Caribbean diaspora show, distance is not determinative. 
These examples reinforce that online relationships can be just as “real” as the 
relationships that are maintained in the same physical space. In fact, they can 
create new ways of relating to one another that are just as intimate as the 
bonds formed in real life.  
 
III. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
 
 The immigration system in the United States is a dense web of federal 
statutes, administrative law, and common law. I do not attempt to summarize 
all of it in this section, but rather provide a cursory overview of the 
mechanisms by which someone can attain citizenship through marriage. At 
multiple points in the process, marriages are interrogated to see if they are 
“shams,” and physically residing together is seen as evidence (and for some 
courts, a prerequisite) to prove a relationship’s authenticity. Throughout my 
research, I did not encounter any cases, guidance, policy statements, statutes 
or regulations that discussed virtual communication technology and how that 
impacts the use of cohabitation as evidence in immigration proceedings.  
For most applicants, there are two stages in the application for U.S. 
citizenship through marriage: application for permanent residency as a 
spouse to U.S. citizen, and if that application is successful, then a second 
application for naturalization to become a U.S. citizen. Some spouses of U.S. 
citizens employed abroad can become naturalized without having previously 
been permanent residents.28 
 
A. Legal Treatment of Permanent Residency Through Marriage 
  
For the first stage, immigrants are expected to file a Form I-130, 
Petition for Alien Relative, in addition to Form I-485 Application to Register 
Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (if the spouse is already in the United 
States and partnered to a U.S. citizen).29 Form I-130 is intended to “establish 
[a U.S. citizen or permanent resident’s] relationship to an eligible relative 
who wishes to come to or remain in the United States permanently.”30 As 
 
(explaining that time and money resources can wear on long-distance relationships, that high 
familiarity is important for relationship success, and that long distance can impact the level 
of intimacy in a relationship). 
28 See 8 U.S.C. § 1430(b), 1430(d) (outlining paths to citizenship not requiring permanent 
residence for spouses of U.S. government employees, employees of certain organizations, 
and surviving immediate family members of deceased members of the armed forces). 
29 Bringing Spouses to Live in the United States as Permanent Residents, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGR. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/family/family-us-citizens/bringing-spouses-live-
united-states-permanent-residents [https://perma.cc/5LPM-J9E5] (last updated Feb. 2, 2018). 
30 I-130, Petition for Alien Relative, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https:// 
www.uscis.gov/i-130 [https://perma.cc/RUC9-HEXA] (last updated Oct. 26, 2020). 
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evidence to show the “bona fides” of a marriage, the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS) mentions that applicants can present a “lease 
showing joint tenancy of a common residence, meaning [the spouses] live at 
the same address together.”31 Although there is no requirement to live 
together to obtain permanent residency, there is an assumption that living 
together makes a relationship more likely to be authentic.  
 Some courts and adjudicative bodies have been receptive to the 
possibility that real marriages can involve long periods of physical 
separation. In Matter of Lenning, the Board of Immigration Appeals stated 
that “where the parties enter into a valid marriage, and there is nothing to 
show that they have since obtained a legal separation or dissolution of that 
marriage, a visa petition . . . should not be denied solely because the parties 
are not residing together.”32 Although the Board ultimately denied the visa 
petition in that case, its reasoning still provides the opportunity for non-
cohabitating couples to successfully have their marriages legally recognized 
as authentic.33 This holding acknowledges that living together is not the 
linchpin that determines whether a marriage is a sham. 
 The court in Boansi v. Johnson took the Lenning reasoning further, 
criticizing the government for relying too heavily on the couple living apart 
as evidence that the marriage was fraudulent.34 In this case, Dr. Boansi (a 
Ghanaian national) married Ms. McNeil (an American citizen).35 After 
marriage, Dr. Boansi tried to find a job near Ms. McNeil, but he ended up 
securing a job apart from her.36 Because she did not want to be away from 
her sick father and Dr. Boansi saw his job as temporary, they decided to live 
apart but visit each other on their time off.37 The court admonished the 
government for ignoring these legitimate reasons for living apart, and said 
the government “den[ied] Dr. Boansi’s applications because he and his wife 
had an unusual living arrangement.”38 Like Lenning, the court’s reasoning 
demonstrated that it was thinking about marriages holistically, recognizing 
that couples can sustain authentic marriages while living apart.  
 However, many courts have also affirmed the government’s 
assumption that separate living situations is evidence of a sham marriage. In 
Reynoso v. Holder, the court concluded that the Board of Immigration 
 
31 Id. 
32 Matter of Lenning, 17 I. & N. Dec. 476, 477 (1980).  
33 Id. at 479. 
34 See Boansi v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 3d 875, 881 (E.D.N.C. 2015) (finding that the 
government “paid little attention to the couple's rationale for living apart or any other 
evidence submitted in support of the couple's legitimate marriage,” resting its decision 
instead on “insinuation and inference.”). 
35 Id. at 877. 
36 Id. at 878. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 881. 
Vol. 6:1]         What is Love?  
 
 
185 
Appeals correctly determined that a couple’s marriage was not entered in 
good faith.39 As evidence, the court pointed out the fact that “there were no 
contemporaneous documents evidencing [the couple’s] cohabitation.”40 The 
court also pointed to testimonial inconsistencies about the exact timeline of 
cohabitation.41 Similarly, in Abuya v. Sessions, testimonial inconsistencies 
about when the couple lived together led the court to determine that substantial 
evidence supported that their marriage was fraudulent.42 Furthermore, despite 
some courts’ recognition that living apart does not categorically preclude the 
existence of a genuine marriage, even these courts recognize that it can 
damage a couple’s case. In Boansi, the court explicitly said that “parties who 
do not reside together may be held to a higher standard.”43 This additional 
burden on couples who live apart shows that the court sees these couples as 
inherently less likely to be real. If courts viewed physically separated couples 
and couples who resided together in the same light, there would be no reason 
to treat them differently for the purposes of immigration decisions. 
 
B. Legal Treatment of Naturalization Through Marriage 
 
Although living together is important for obtaining permanent 
residency through marriage, there is strong statutory language that makes it 
particularly crucial for successful naturalization. To become naturalized as a 
U.S. citizen, generally applicants must be “resid[ing] continuously, after 
being lawfully admitted for permanent residence, within the United States for 
at least three years, and during the three years immediately preceding the date 
of filing [their] application ha[ve] been living in marital union with the citizen 
spouse.”44 This citizen spouse must have “been physically present in the 
United States for periods totaling at least half of that time and ha[ve] resided 
within the State or the district of the Service in the United States in which the 
applicant filed his application for at least three months.”45 Like the application 
for permanent residency, there is a strong assumption in the naturalization 
process that residing in the same place is evidence that a relationship is real. 
 The statutory definition of the “in marital union” requirement for 
naturalization through marriage has been contested. The Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), in one of its regulations promulgated pursuant to 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, defined martial union as “actually 
 
39 Reynoso v. Holder, 711 F.3d 199, 213 (1st Cir. 2013). 
40 Id. at 204. 
41 Id. at 207. 
42 Abuya v. Sessions, 873 F.3d 650, 654–55 (8th Cir. 2017).  
43 Boansi, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 880. 
44 8 U.S.C. § 1430(a). 
45 Id. 
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resid[ing] with his or her current spouse.”46 They also stipulated, in that same 
regulation, that spouses can still be naturalized if “the applicant and spouse live 
apart because of circumstances beyond their control, such as military service 
in the Armed Forces of the United States or essential business or occupational 
demands, rather than because of voluntary legal or informal separation.”47 
Informal separations are “evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine 
whether it is sufficient enough to signify the dissolution of the marital 
union.”48 Although the DHS recognizes that couples can be physically apart 
and still be considered “in marital union,” the general rule still defines marital 
unions as relationships in which the couple resides together.  
 Courts have also weighed in on the statutory marital union 
requirement, and some courts have chosen to interpret the Immigration and 
Nationality Act’s “in marital union” requirement and its exceptions more 
expansively. The court in In re Olan asserted that this requirement means that 
couples must “liv[e] in the status of a valid marriage.”49 In this case, a couple 
lived together continuously, but had a two and a half month gap where 
petitioner’s spouse left the home after a fight, continued to periodically visit, 
but did not fully return to live at their shared home.50 The court did not see 
this temporary separation as an issue because it interpreted “marital union” 
as a status that transcends two people physically being in the same place.51 
 In Paiva v. Curda, the court interpreted DHS’s regulations around the 
“in marital union” requirement and its exceptions to allow physically 
separated couples to still apply for naturalization.52 The case addressed the 
denial of a naturalization application for a permanent resident after a couple, 
including one U.S. citizen and one permanent resident, informally 
separated.53 The government claimed that DHS’s case-by-case evaluation of 
informally separated couples only applied to couples living under the same 
roof.54 The court disagreed with the government’s interpretation and viewed 
DHS’s language more expansively, reasoning that it applies to any informal 
separation, not just informal separations where the couple still lives 
together.55 It also explicitly noted that “real marriages—meaning 
nonfraudulent ones—may involve situations where the spouses do not live 
together, whether for informal separations with the intention to remain 
 
46 8 C.F.R. § 319.1(b)(1) (2020). 
47 Id. § 319.1(b)(2)(ii)(C). 
48 Id. § 319.1(b)(2)(ii)(B). 
49 257 F. Supp. 884, 890 (S.D. Cal. 1966). 
50 Id. at 887–89. 
51 See id. at 891 (holding that the marital union is a bond that does not dissolve with physical 
separation). 
52 162 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1058–59, 1066 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
53 Id. at 1058–59. 
54 Id. at 1060–61. 
55 Id. at 1066. 
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validly married . . . or for involuntary separations where the couple is validly 
married but one spouse is deployed in the military or working abroad.”56 
Furthermore, “there are surely many variations of sleeping and living 
arrangements that are appropriately considered ‘living in marital union.’”57 
Here, the court recognizes that married couples’ partnerships take many 
forms, and physical separation does not preclude an authentic relationship. 
As in Paiva, the court in United States v. Onabanjo did not see the statutory 
residence requirement as absolute. They saw the residency requirement as a 
general rule that applied to most couples, but was subject to certain 
exceptions for periods of separation.58 
 Other courts have been more restrictive with how they interpret the 
INA’s “in marital union” language. In United States v. Maduno, the court stated 
that short periods of temporary separation (like going on vacations) are allowed, 
and the couple can still be considered living in marital union.59 However, the 
couple in Maduno was physically separated for years, and the court thought 
this period of separation precluded them from fulfilling the INA’s statutory 
requirement.60  
Likewise, the court in United States v. Moses said that “[i]t is clear 
that ‘living in marital union’ indicates that the couple live together in a marital 
state.”61 Rejecting the rule in Olan, the court said that marital union requires 
more than just a marital status.62 The court recognized that there are 
exceptions to the requirement of residing together, but varying testimony in 
the case showed that different INS officials do not always recognize these 
exceptions.63 One INS assistant director for examinations testified that 
physical separation would lead to additional questions, but not preclude 
naturalization.64 Another INS examiner testified that if the applicant had 
informed her that he did not currently live with his spouse, she would have told 
him he did not qualify for naturalization, without any further questioning.65 
 
56 Id. at 1067. 
57 Id.  
58 See 351 F.3d 1064, 1067 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that the district court erred in not 
considering the applicability of exceptions in DHS’s regulation on the INA’s “in marital 
union” requirement). 
59 40 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (11th Cir. 1994). 
60 Id. at 1217. 
61 94 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 1996).  
62 Id. at 186. 
63 Id.  
64 See id. (testifying that “a separation ‘would raise a question that we’d have to look into’ 
to establish ‘whether there was a legal separation, which would raise the bar under that 
section; if it was an informal separation, what was the reason for the separation . . . in an 
effort to determine that the marriage was bona fide.’”). 
65 Id.  
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Both testimonies, and ultimately the court, relied on the assumption that lack 
of cohabitation meant that a relationship was less likely to be real.  
In Li Dang Ding v. Gulick, physical residence together was decisive. 
Shioura, a U.S. citizen, married Ding, a Chinese national, allowing Ding to gain 
permanent residency.66 In August 2004, Shioura moved to Hawaii for a new 
job.67 Ding moved to Hawaii, but returned to live in California in fall 2005.68 
The court acknowledged that Ding went to Hawaii for multiple trips that lasted 
months, but concludes that those trips were visits because Ding resided in 
California.69 The court did not find their joint ownership of property, their 
child, and their shared names on documents compelling.70 Instead, the court 
fixated on the INS requirement that the couple “actually resided together” 
and interpreted that requirement as physically being in the same place.71 
Much like how physical separation is treated in the permanent 
residency context, there is a strong presumption in the naturalization context 
that living apart will make a court less likely to recognize the validity of a 
couple’s relationship. There is regulatory language that requires “actually 
resid[ing]” together, with some exceptions for voluntary and involuntary 
separations.72 Courts seem to look at cases holistically, placing varying levels 
of importance on physical separation as evidence. Despite this flexibility, 
there still seems to be an underlying assumption that couples are less likely 
to be in real relationships if they do not physically reside together. 
However, in all of these cases, regulations, and statutes, there was still 
no discussion of the ways in which individuals can foster genuine 
relationships with the help of virtual communication technology. Although 
courts are divided about how essential residing together is for demonstrating 
the authenticity of a marital relationship, they all operate under the strong 
statutory presumption that a relationship is less likely to be real if spouses do 
not live in the same place. Even courts that interpret the statutory 
requirements more expansively—having made decisions since virtual 
communication technology became commonplace—have not discussed this 
technology or pointed to the use of it as evidence of the authenticity of a 
marriage. It is possible that virtually conducted relationships have been 
addressed in administrative adjudications that do not lead to litigation, and 
therefore will not be memorialized in court opinions. Still, there is little 
formal legal recognition of how much virtual communication technology has 
revolutionized the way we communicate, how the intimacy of romantic 
 
66 Civil No. 11-00070 SOM-BMK, 2012 WL 300475, at *3 (D. Haw. Jan. 31, 2012). 
67 Id.  
68 Id. 
69 Id. at *12. 
70 Id. at *13. 
71 Id. 
72 8 C.F.R. § 319.1(b)(1)–(2) (2020). 
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relationships can be created and maintained online, and how that should 
impact court and administrative agencies’ determinations of which marriages 
are shams and which marriages are genuine.  
 
IV. CONTEXTUALIZING THE MOTIVATIONS BEHIND THE IMMIGRATION 
SYSTEM’S INTERROGATION OF MARRIAGE  
 
When discussing the immigration system’s treatment of marriage, it 
is important to recognize that the state is not just narrowly trying to prove the 
authenticity of relationships; it is also trying to identify fraud against the state, 
police the institution of marriage, and police who enters the United States and 
has a claim to citizenship. Understanding these motivations helps explain the 
way the state interrogates relationships and why it would be hesitant to 
recognize virtual relationships as real relationships.  
In the United States, marriage fraud is considered a crime.73 More 
specifically, “[a]ny individual who knowingly enters into a marriage for the 
purpose of evading any provision of the immigration laws shall be 
imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or fined not more than $250,000, or 
both.”74 Similarly, making false statements on immigration documents is 
punishable by up to 15 years in prison (or 25 years, if the false statement was 
used to facilitate terrorism).75 Because of the possibility of lengthy prison 
time, it is clear that the state treats marriage fraud as a serious offense.  
A brochure from U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
on marriage fraud further demonstrates the state’s view of the 
interconnectedness of immigration, marriage, fraud, and crime.76 The 
brochure provides a number to report suspected cases of marriage fraud to 
the Homeland Security Investigations Tip Line and includes a photo of a 
prison hallway juxtaposed against a church aisle set up for a wedding.77 It 
also states that “[m]arriage fraud is not a victimless, innocent crime” and that 
it “trad[es] America’s security for financial gain.”78 According to ICE’s 
brochure, marriage fraud “weakens our nation’s security and makes us less 
safe” because “[t]errorists and other criminals can use marriage fraud as a 
 
73 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c); see 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (making it a crime to make false statements 
on documents required by immigration laws). 
74 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c). 
75 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). 
76 HOMELAND SEC. INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGR. AND CUSTOMS ENF’T, MARRIAGE FRAUD 
IS A FED. CRIME, 1–2 (Jun. 2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Doc 
ument/2016/marriageFraudBrochure.pdf [https://perma.cc/9PJ6-G2Z6]. It is meaningful to 
note that this brochure was released in June 2016, before the Trump administration took 
control of ICE. 
77 Id. at 1. 
78 Id. at 2. 
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vehicle to enter the United States.”79 This punitive, enforcement-focused 
language shows one of the lenses by which the U.S. government views 
couples entering the United States. In the eyes of the U.S. government, these 
couples are not simply trying to immigrate to the United States; they are also 
potential suspects of criminal fraud and terrorism.  
Kerry Abrams, in her article “Marriage Fraud,” explains this policing 
of immigrating couples as a function of the substantial benefit that is received 
through marriage. Public benefits become tied to marriage because 
lawmakers believe the long-term, committed nature of a marriage makes that 
couple deserving of benefits.80 If lawmakers think marital status by itself does 
not provide “an adequate proxy” for long-term commitment with respect to 
the benefit being provided, then the state will adopt more stringent tests to 
assess the validity of the marriage.81 Because the immigration system confers 
lawful presence in the United States and couples are able to divorce relatively 
easily after getting a green card, marriage in the immigration context is more 
vulnerable to fraud; therefore, the state polices it more heavily than marriage 
in other contexts.82 
Abrams also reasons that lawmakers see marriage fraud as harming 
the public, which motivates them to take state action to combat it.83 In the 
eyes of the state, fraudulent marriages can harm the public by taking benefits 
away from the public that might have been used by someone else, and by 
allowing people into the country who otherwise would not have been eligible 
for entry.84 Marriage also serves an assimilative function, and fraudulent 
marriages open the doors for less deserving immigrants who have not gone 
through that acculturation.85 In other words, legitimatizing marriage serves a 
gatekeeping function to keep out immigrants who do not deserve citizenship 
in the eyes of the state. These theories of harm help contextualize why the 
state is so preoccupied with proving the authenticity of marriage. 
Furthermore, U.S. immigration law has used definitions of marriage 
to exclude certain classes of immigrants based on their race, gender, and 
perceived moral character.86 Immigration officials use a Western definition 
of marriage to make decisions about who can enter the country lawfully; 
those that fit that definition are allowed in, while those who do not are 
 
79 Id. 
80 Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 37–38 (2012).  
81 Id. at 38.  
82 Id. at 38–39. 
83 Id. at 49. 
84 Id. at 54. 
85 Id. at 53–54.  
86 See Noga Firstenberg, Marriage and Morality: Examining the International Marriage 
Broker Regulation Act, 18 ASIAN AM. L.J. 83, 111–112 (2011) (asserting that definitions of 
marriage were essential components of developing immigration policy, and this policy was 
used to discriminate against immigrants because of their character and culture). 
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excluded.87 This privileging of certain kinds of marriages is reflected in U.S. 
immigration regulations that emphasize children and joint ownership of 
property, which are unattainable or undesired for many marriages outside 
of the United States.88  
The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA) is 
another example of the ways in which the state enhances scrutiny of 
marriages that fall outside of normative definitions of marriage. IMBRA adds 
regulatory burdens to marriages that are facilitated by international marriage 
brokers.89 The intention of the legislation is to prevent potentially exploitative 
relationships, but IMBRA also can be tied to the historical restrictions 
preventing Asian women from immigrating to the United States.90 Asian 
women make up a large percentage of international marriage broker marriages 
and have historically been sexualized and seen as deviant; IMBRA reinforces 
those perceptions by making it more difficult for them to come to the United 
States. Preserving the sanctity of a white, Western definition of marriage and 
exerting moral judgment on those who fall outside of those boundaries are 
more reasons why the state polices the validity of marriage in the immigration 
context so heavily.91 Both IMBRA and the privileging of certain components 
of marriage, like the joint ownership of property, reinforce the immigration 
system’s efforts to exclude and engage in gatekeeping.  
Stephen Lee, in his article “Family Separation as Slow Death,” argues 
that the immigration system is characterized by separation.92 Instead of acting 
as a tool for transnational families to reunite, U.S. immigration laws are 
committed to keeping families apart.93 Lee asserts that this rule of separation 
can be supported by the long wait times that families face before they get 
visas to reunite, the stringent enforcement of immigration laws, narrow 
opportunities for adjustment of status, and the application of anti–money 
laundering laws to immigrants trying to send money to their families 
abroad.94 Lee’s argument adds further context to the motivations behind the 
immigration system; although the state technically allows families to reunite, 
the way its rules are applied instead reflects a motivation to separate families 
and maintain their separation. 
 
87 Id. at 112. 
88 Id. at 118–19.  
89 Id. at 84.  
90 Id. at 84–85.  
91 Id. at 85. 
92 See Stephen Lee, Family Separation as Slow Death, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 2319, 2322 
(2019) (“[O]ur immigration system is pervasively organized around the principles of 
family separation.”).  
93 See id. at 2323 (“[A] holistic examination of the broader immigration system shows that 
the exception of family separations operates much more like the rule . . . .”).  
94 Id. at 2323–24.  
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Beyond the immigration system, marriage is an institution that has 
traditionally emphasized cohabitation, and the corresponding assumption of 
consummation, which acts to validate the marriage. Many opponents of 
same-sex marriage have espoused this traditional conjugal view of marriage, 
which defines marriage as “beg[inning] by commitment and sealed by sexual 
intercourse” that is rooted in the goal of procreation.95 These opponents assert 
that the state’s historical interest in regulating marriage stems from this 
traditional view.96 Courts have also validated this relationship between the 
legitimacy of marriage, consummation, and cohabitation.97 Some courts have 
gone further and invalidated marriages that have not been consummated.98 
Applied to the immigration context, when the state polices the boundaries of 
marriage and ties it to cohabitation, whether that is through statutory 
requirements or higher burdens of proof, it is also reinforcing the traditional 
entangling of marriage legitimacy, cohabitation, and consummation.  
The background considerations that animate the marriage and 
immigration systems help explain how courts make decisions about the 
authenticity of relationships. Because marriage conveys immense 
immigration benefits and marriage fraud is seen as a serious crime, courts and 
administrative agencies are motivated to vigorously interrogate relationships. 
Marriage in the immigration context is characterized by enforcement and 
restriction, not the desire to expand the pool of people who are eligible for 
benefits. Furthermore, the American immigration system, both historically and 
presently, has been organized around the principles of immigrant exclusion and 
family separation. In this kind of environment, the state is disinclined to view 
virtual relationships as real. Despite the ability of virtual communication 
technology to foster authentic connections, the state is incentivized to ignore 
or deemphasize this ability because of its competing concerns.  
 
V. VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY’S IMPACT ON CHILD 
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS 
 
In child custody and parental visitation, courts and state legislatures 
have embraced virtual communication technology as a way to keep both 
 
95 Andrew Forsyth, Defining Marriage, 97 SOUNDINGS: AN INTERDISC. J. 297, 298 (2014). 
96 See id. (arguing that linking marriage to children’s welfare is what motivates the state’s 
recognition of marriage as a public good).  
97 See, e.g., Eldredge v. Eldredge, 43 N.Y.S.2d 796, 797 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (“[T]he mere fact that 
a party agrees to and does enter into the marriage contract of itself implies a representation on 
his or her part that he or she will consummate the marriage by cohabitation . . . .”). 
98 See, e.g., Moussa v. INS, 302 F.3d 823, 826 (8th Cir. 2002) (“Immigration law does not 
recognize the validity of a proxy marriage which has never been consummated . . . .”); 
Lawrence Drew Borten, Sex, Procreation, and the State Interest in Marriage, 102 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2002) (pointing to court decision language that suggests “marriage 
without sex is a sham.”).  
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parents in contact with their children when one parent chooses to relocate. 
Courts and state legislatures still do not draw an equivalence between the 
quality of virtual and physical visitation, but they are much more explicitly 
receptive than the immigration system of the possibility of connection being 
fostered online. These differences can be explained by the motivations behind 
both systems and what is at stake. While child custody is supposed to prioritize 
the best interests of the child,99 the immigration system has no similar mandate 
to prioritize the best interests of the families impacted by its policies.  
McCoy v. McCoy is often acknowledged as a groundbreaking case 
because of its incorporation of virtual communication technology in 
visitation plans.100 In this case, the parents had joint custody, and the father 
had 66 days total visitation time.101 The mother wanted to move to California 
from New Jersey for a job that would have a more stable salary, medical 
benefits, and fewer travel hours.102 As part of the visitation plan, the mother 
proposed using webcams to allow the father to keep in touch with their child 
on a daily basis.103 Although the court did not draw an equivalence between 
virtual contact and physical contact,104 it described the webcam solution 
proposed by the mother as a “creative and innovative” way to “enhance 
visitation.”105 In this case, the court saw virtual contact as lesser than physical 
contact, but it also recognized the potential of virtual communication 
technology as a medium for maintaining the closeness of familial relationships.  
Other courts have also been receptive of the possibility of maintaining 
parental bonds online if one parent relocates with the child. In McGuinness 
v. McGuinness, the court criticized the lower court for not considering 
alternative visitation to accommodate for parental relocation.106 It elaborated 
that “[p]hysical separation does not preclude each parent from maintaining 
significant and substantial involvement in a child’s life, which is clearly 
desirable. There are alternate methods of maintaining a meaningful 
 
99 See, e.g., Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (“The chancellor in exercising 
his jurisdiction upon petition . . . acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the interest of 
the child. He is to put himself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate, and careful parent’ . . . 
and make provision for the child accordingly.”) (citation omitted). 
100 Elisabeth Bach-Van Horn, Virtual Visitation: Are Webcams Being Used as an Excuse to 
Allow Relocation?, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 171, 174 (2008).  
101 McCoy v. McCoy, 764 A.2d 449, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001). 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 451–52.  
104 See id. at 454 (“Every time a custodial parent moves to a distant location, the ability of the 
noncustodial parent to exercise visitation rights is adversely affected” and it is “obvious” that 
“defendant’s relationship will be substantially altered by the move . . . .”). 
105 Id. at 454. 
106 See McGuinness v. McGuinness, 970 P.2d 1078, 1074–83 (Nev. 1998) (“In denying 
Teresa’s motion, the district court failed to seriously consider the possibility of reasonable, 
alternative visitation and focused on the fact that a move would render the current joint 
custody arrangement impossible.”). 
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relationship, including telephone calls, e-mail messages, letters, and frequent 
visitation.”107 Similarly, the court in Burke v. Burke agreed with the lower 
court’s assessment of one parent’s suggestion of virtual visitation as a 
“unique, forward thinking and viable communication alternative.”108 
However, courts have not been universally receptive of virtual 
visitation. In Nighswander v. Sudick, the court denied the mother’s relocation 
request to California.109 The court emphasized the importance of the father’s 
physical presence with his children, stating that:  
Even with telephone and e-mail support to the visitation 
schedule, the nature of Mr. Nighswander’s parenting 
relationship with his children will transform if they move to 
California. He will no longer be able to periodically meet and 
confer with their teachers. He will no longer be able to attend 
parent orientated events, recitals, plays, assemblies, and other 
school and extracurricular events . . . .110 
Likewise, the court in Marshall v. Marshall rejected the use of webcams for 
visitation and did not see virtual communication technology as capable of 
fostering the same sorts of familial bonds as physically being together.111 
 State legislatures have also stepped in to codify the ability of parents 
to pursue virtual visitation. In 2004, Utah was “the first . . . state to 
legislate the authority of judges to include virtual visitation in divorce 
decrees.”112 According to Utah’s statute, “[e]ach parent shall permit and 
encourage . . . reasonable and uncensored communications with the child, 
in the form of mail privileges and virtual parent-time if the equipment is 
reasonably available . . . .”113 It also defines “virtual parent-time” as “parent-
time facilitated by tools such as telephone, email, instant messaging, video 
conferencing, and other wired or wireless technologies over the Internet . . . .”114 
Although Utah allows for virtual parent-time, it does not draw an equivalence 
between virtual and physical contact, specifying that “[v]irtual parent-time is 
 
107 Id. at 1077–78. 
108 Burke v. Burke, No. M2000-01111-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 921770, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. Jan. 8, 2002).  
109 Nighswander v. Sudick, No. FA 97393793, 2000 WL 157905, at *12 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 26, 2000).  
110 Id. at *8. 
111 See Marshall v. Marshall, 814 A.2d 1226, 1233 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (“While the Internet 
undoubtedly has fostered a myriad of ways for people to maintain communication and while 
computer video cameras allow people to ‘feel’ closer even when separated by hundreds of 
miles, such technology cannot realistically be equated with day-to-day contact between 
parents and young children.”).  
112 Bach-Van Horn, supra note 100, at 181.  
113 UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33(14) (West 2020).  
114 Id. § 30-3-32(3)(g). 
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designed to supplement, not replace, in-person parent-time.”115 Still, the Utah 
legislature has explicitly recognized the ability of virtual communication 
technology to nurture parent-child relationships when individuals are 
physically separated from one another. Other states have also passed similar 
statutory language to allow for virtual visitation, including Texas and 
Wisconsin.116 Like Utah, both Texas and Wisconsin have made sure to 
specify that virtual visitation does not replace any requirement of physical 
contact between the separated parent and child.117 
For decades, legislatures and courts have grappled with the question 
of whether virtual communication technology can facilitate meaningful 
parent-child relationships in the context of virtual visitation. In this context, 
virtual communication technology is seen as a supplement, not a replacement, 
for physical contact; physical contact is still perceived as superior in quality 
to virtual contact. However, unlike in the immigration context, the state has 
at least recognized the importance and utility of these technologies to help 
maintain familial relationships. Virtual communication technology, within 
the framework of proving the authenticity of marriages for the purposes of 
immigrating to the United States, has largely been left unaddressed. 
The reasoning behind why virtual communication technology has 
been accepted in the visitation context, but not in the immigration context, is 
a challenging question to disentangle. The differences in treatment could 
speak to the difference in policy implications, policy motivations and the 
parties involved. While virtual visitation aims to maintain parental bonds, the 
immigration system, as it is currently structured, maintains couple separation. 
Virtual visitation is motivated by the best interests of the child, whereas the 
immigration system is motivated by preventing fraud. Virtual visitation 
values parental freedom of movement, while the immigration system upholds 
family separation and immigrant exclusion. Virtual visitation regulates 
citizens, and the immigration system regulates non-citizens.  
Child custody has an underlying motivation to keep parents 
physically with their children, ostensibly towards the goal of the best interests 
 
115 Id.  
116 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.015(b) (West 2019) (“If a conservator of a child requests 
the court to order periods of electronic communication with the child under this section, the 
court may award the conservator reasonable periods of electronic communication with the child 
to supplement the conservator’s periods of possession of the child.”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(e) 
(2020) (“If the court grants periods of physical placement to more than one parent, the court 
may grant to either or both parents a reasonable amount of electronic communication . . . .”). 
117 See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.015(d) (West 2019) (“The availability of electronic 
communication under this section is not intended as a substitute for physical possession of 
or access to the child where otherwise appropriate.”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(e) (2020) 
(“Electronic communication with the child may be used only to supplement a parent's periods 
of physical placement with the child. Electronic communication may not be used as a 
replacement or as a substitute for a parent's periods of physical placement with the child.”). 
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of the child. Utah, Texas, and Wisconsin have all conditioned allowing virtual 
visitation on meeting the best interests of the child.118 Furthermore, social 
science research suggests that robust and frequent parental involvement is 
important for the development of children.119 Geographic distance can 
diminish this involvement by “reduc[ing] the frequency and duration of 
contact between the child and non-custodial parent.”120 These developmental 
concerns are particularly acute for young children under 7, when bonds to 
parents are fragile and can more easily be damaged by prolonged periods of 
separation.121 Courts and state legislatures, because they condition virtual 
visitation on the fact that it is a supplement, not replacement, for in-person 
visitation, share this presumption that physical contact is crucial to ensure the 
best interests of the child. However, the state will allow relocation and virtual 
visitation when they are holistically considered in the best interests of the 
child.122 The state offers this flexibility for courts to determine what is best 
for the child, whether that is relocation, virtual visitation, or otherwise. 
Unlike child custody, the immigration system has no mandate to keep 
in mind the best interests of the transnational couple. The immigration 
system, when trying to prove the authenticity of marriages, is organized 
around separation and motivated by the prevention of fraud. Starting from a 
goal of protecting the best interests of the parties is a very different starting 
point than ferreting out fraud. Furthermore, recognizing the viability of 
virtual contact in fostering relationships, in the child custody context, allows 
for children to maintain contact with a non-custodial parent who lives far 
away. The same recognition, in the immigration context, allows for more 
expansive access to citizenship, a benefit that has historically been 
exclusionary, and more opportunities for defrauding the state. In other words, 
 
118 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-33(14) (West 2020) (“Each parent shall permit and 
encourage . . . virtual parent-time . . . taking into consideration: the best interests of the 
child”); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.015(b)(1) (West 2019) (“[T]he court shall consider: whether 
electronic communication is in the best interest of the child . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 767.41(4)(e) 
(2020) (“Granting a parent electronic communication with the child during the other parent's 
periods of physical placement shall be based on whether it is in the child's best interest . . . .”). 
119 See Kenneth Waldron, A Review of Social Science Research on Post Divorce Relocation, 
19 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 337, 359 (2005) (noting that “[a] review of the research on the 
effects of increased father involvement is unambiguous: a child does better in every aspect 
of adjustment that has been measured, both long-term and short-term, if there is active father 
involvement” and these conclusions likely also apply to mother involvement but mother 
involvement is much less studied). 
120 Id. at 357.  
121 Id. at 349. 
122 See McCoy v. McCoy, 764 A.2d 449, 454 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (recognizing 
the fact that relocation increases barriers to visitation for a non-custodial parent “alone may 
not be contrary to the best interest of the child, so long as an alternate visitation schedule can 
be created that continues and preserves the relationship between the child and the 
noncustodial parent.”). 
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the implications for recognizing virtual communication technology look very 
different for the immigration and child custody contexts. Also, the 
immigration system’s “in marital union” requirement provides a statutory 
basis for requiring physical togetherness that the child custody system lacks.  
 The child custody system also values parents’ freedom of movement, 
unlike the immigration system’s emphasis on restriction of couples’ 
movement. Although the interests of the child are paramount, courts have 
held that their decision-making around relocation should consider the 
freedom of movement for the custodial parent.123 The immigration system 
does the opposite of valuing freedom of movement. Adjustment of lawful 
presence status in the United States allows undocumented immigrants to 
freely leave the country.124 However, prolonged wait times for adjustment of 
status and the possibility of not being able to reenter the United States 
effectively trap many undocumented immigrants in the country, restricting 
their freedom of movement.125  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Virtual communication technology has revolutionized the way people 
communicate, but immigration law has not caught up. The Internet has 
become a medium that can minimize the distance between loved ones, and 
both create and foster familial bonds. There is little doubt that a long-distance 
relationship maintained by virtual communication is any less real than a 
relationship between two people in the same physical place. The child 
custody system has integrated this technology into its relocation doctrines 
and statutes. However, there is little acknowledgement of these technologies 
when the state is trying to validate the marriages of immigrants who seek 
lawful presence in the United States.  
This difference speaks to the different motivations behind the child 
custody and immigration systems. Addressing these differences goes beyond 
the scope of just virtual communication technology and speaks to the historic 
and current organizing principles of the immigration system. However, 
recognizing virtual communication technology in the immigration context 
can still be a small step towards making the system more inclusive. Below 
are a few recommendations for how this recognition can be accomplished.  
 
123 See, e.g. Holder v. Polanski, 544 A.2d 852, 855 (N.J. 1988) (noting that “[o]ur problem 
is to balance [the rights of the noncustodial parent] with the right of the custodial parent to 
seek a better life for himself or herself in this or another state. As previously noted, the 
calculus for solving this problem includes the custodial parent's interest in freedom of 
movement as qualified by his or her custodial obligation, the State's interest in protecting the 
best interests of the child, and the competing interests of the noncustodial parent.”).  
124 Lee, supra note 92, at 2355. 
125 Id. at 2352. 
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• Incorporate virtual communication technology into immigration 
regulations: There is still a lack of clarity around how periods of 
physical separation impact the “in marital union” requirement and 
how the authenticity of relationships is proven. A rulemaking that 
explicitly addresses how virtual communication technology can be 
proof of a valid marriage could provide additional clarity. Also, 
addressing virtual communication technology would be a recognition 
of how more and more modern relationships are being conducted 
online. Possible future pandemics and the current COVID-19 
pandemic, characterized by closed borders and virtual communication, 
undoubtedly make this recognition even more important. 
 
• Amend the “in marital union” requirement: As it exists and as it 
is interpreted by DHS, the “in marital union” requirement relies on an 
outdated definition of what it means to be married. As discussed, 
married couples can live apart, rely on virtual communication 
technology, and still be authentically married. Although DHS 
recognizes this possibility, its general rule still requires couples to 
“actually reside” with each other. Amending or eliminating these 
requirements will make the immigration system more inclusive of 
couples living apart and focused on family reunification, rather than 
family separation.  
 
• Additional social science research: Although some research exists 
on geographic distance’s impact on long-distance couples, there is 
more that can be done. For example, researchers could explore the 
difference between technology that allows face-to-face contact (like 
Skype) and technology that relies on voice or written communication 
(like phone calls and instant messaging). Also, researchers could 
investigate the emergence of virtual reality and the impact it might 
have on transnational relationships.  
 
Considering the current immigration system and the politics and 
discourse surrounding it, there is a low likelihood that any of these reforms 
would gain traction. The United States is experiencing a drastic contraction 
in immigration and an increasing virulence against immigrants. Rather than 
follow popular sentiment, these proposed reforms would turn the immigration 
system’s focus towards reuniting families, rather than separating them. They 
would recognize the dignity of immigrant relationships that do not adhere to 
the strict government definition of marriage that is tied to physical 
togetherness. Historically, marriage has been one of the few clear paths to 
citizenship in immigration law. Although this privileging of marriage has its 
own problems, the immigration system clearly sees at least some value in 
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allowing American citizens to bring their spouses to the United States. 
Ironically, by placing such an emphasis on cohabitation and relying on an 
outdated definition of romantic partnerships, the system is doing the exact 
opposite—keeping families apart.  
 
 
 
